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Police, Race, and the Production of
Capital Homicides
Jeffrey Fagan†
Amanda Geller*
Racial disparities in capital punishment have been well
documented for decades. Over 50 studies have shown that Black
defendants are more likely than their White counterparts to be charged
with capital-eligible crimes, to be convicted, and to be sentenced to death.
Racial disparities in charging and sentencing in capital-eligible
homicides are largest for the small number of cases where Black
defendants murder White victims compared to within-race killings, or the
rare instances where Whites murder Black or other ethnic minority
victims. These patterns are robust to rich controls for non-racial
characteristics and state sentencing guidelines. This article backs up the
research on racial disparities to an earlier stage of capital case
processing: the production of capital-eligible cases beginning with the
identification of potential defendants by the police. It seeks to trace these
sentencing disparities to earlier stages in the processing of homicides.
Using data from the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, we examine
every homicide reported between 1976 and 2009, and find that homicides
with White victims are significantly more likely to be “cleared” by the
arrest of a suspect than are homicides with minority victims. We estimate
a series of hierarchical regressions to show that a substantial portion of
this disparity is explained by social and demographic characteristics of
the county in which homicides take place. Most notably, counties with
large concentrations of minority residents have lower clearance rates
than do predominantly White counties; however, county characteristics
do not fully explain the observed race-of-victim disparities. Our findings
raise equal protection concerns, paving the way for further research into
the production of capital-eligible homicides and the administration of the
death penalty.
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INTRODUCTION
Racial disparities have been endemic to the administration of
capital punishment in the U.S. since the nation’s founding. 1 Before the
Civil War, many Southern states explicitly legislated that slaves – and
sometimes free Blacks – could be sentenced to death for crimes
punishable by lesser penalties when committed by Whites. 2 Although the
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited the imposition of
differential penalties by race for the same crime – and explicitly
prohibited “the hanging of a Black man for a crime for which the White
man is not to be hanged” (39th Congress, 1866), the death penalty has
continued to be used predominantly upon African-American defendants
and those convicted of crimes against White victims throughout the
country’s history.
A robust research literature confirms that racial disparities have
infected capital punishment to the present day. 3 Between 1930, when
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z382R3NX4X
Copyright © 2018 Regents of University of California
†
Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Professor of
Epidemiology, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University. Thanks to
Gregory Bernstein, Morgan Buras and Zach Chen for excellent research assistance. James
Alan Fox generously shared an augmented SHR data file from 1976-2016. Franklin
Zimring inspired this project in 2006 with his market share theory of deterrence and
capital punishment. His footprints are all over this project, and we are deeply in his debt.
Portions of this essay appeared in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK TO POLICING IN THE
UNITED STATES (Tamara Rice Lave and Eric Miller, eds. 2019).
*
Associate Clinical Professor, Department of Sociology, New York University. 1
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After
McCleskey, in 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 35 (2007) (“A cardinal feature of the
death penalty in the United States has always been its racially biased use.”).
2
See, e.g., WILLIAM BOWERS, GLENN L. PIERCE, & JOHN F. MCDEVITT, LEGAL
HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 139-40 (1984); STUART
BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 140-42 (2002); DAVID
GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION 172 (2010); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2004).
3
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Capital Punishment, in BEYOND REPAIR ?:
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 121 (Stephen P. Garvey, ed. 2003); see generally
Symposium, Race to Execution, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1401 (2004); Stephen B. Bright,
Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction
of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995); Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth
E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal
Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (1994); Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso,
George Woodworth & Abijah Taylor, Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging
and Sentencing in North Carolina, 1990-2009, 94 N.C.L. REV. 1997 (2014).
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official statistics on capital punishment were first issued, and the
moratorium on executions following Furman v. Georgia in 1972, almost
half the persons executed for murder and 90% of those executed for rape
were African American, despite their much lower share of the defendant
population for each of those crimes and their share of the U.S. population. 4
The constitutional status of racial disparities in capital punishment
animated the majority concurrences of three of the justices in Furman.5
Race as a contested jurisprudential factor in death sentencing and
executions reached a watershed in McCleskey v. Kemp.6 Despite the
strong evidence submitted by David Baldus and his colleagues 7 of
interracial and intraracial sentencing disparities in McCleskey, the
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, failed to find that these racially skewed
practices violated either the 8th or 14th Amendments. The McCleskey
majority opinion, authored by Justice Powell, accepted both the
methodological premise and the factual interpretation of the evidence, but
rejected the constitutional claims. Powell argued that only a showing of
discriminatory purpose would satisfy the evidentiary demands of an Equal
Protection violation, and that the evidence was insufficient to invalidate
the Georgia statute as applied under the 8 th Amendment. 8 In a
conversation with his biographer, Professor John Jeffries, shortly after
leaving the bench, Justice Powell later expressed his regrets at having
written the majority opinion in McCleskey. 9 In the years after McCleskey,
legal scholars have gloomily raised questions based on the Court’s
reasoning in that opinion about the capacity of courts to redress bias in

4

See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at n. 11 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 364); see
also Dennis D. Dorin, Two Different Worlds: Criminologists, Justices, and Racial
Discrimination in the Imposition of Capital Punishment in Rape Cases, 72 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1667, 1670 (1981).
5
See infra Section II.A. and accompanying notes.
6
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
7
David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 661, 698-703 (1983).
8
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 299-319.
9
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451, 530 (1994)
(noting how Justice Powell said that given a second chance, he would now join the four
dissenters in that case and reverse the majority of death sentences in the U.S.). Powell
went further, saying that “capital punishment should be abolished” (id. at 451); see also
John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Change of Mind that Came Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1994,
at A23.
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the criminal justice system. 10 In part, the gloom results not just from the
Court’s demand for a showing of discriminatory purpose, but also by
making it so hard to prove it in death penalty cases. 11
Both before and after the McCleskey decision, research on racial
disparities in capital punishment focused attention on charging decisions
by prosecutors and sentencing decisions by judges and juries, usually
contingent on prosecutors filing a death notice and following a penalty
phase trial that resulted in a conviction on the capital murder charge.
McCleskey, for example, was decided based on the absence of evidence
of discriminatory intent or purpose by prosecutors. Still, the evidence of
disparate racial treatment by prosecutors is robust and consistent. Over 50
studies have shown that Black defendants are more likely than their White
counterparts to be charged with capital-eligible crimes, to be convicted,
and to be sentenced to death. Racial disparities in charging and sentencing
in capital-eligible homicides are largest for the small number of cases
where Black defendants murder White victims compared to within-race
killings, or where Whites murder Black or other ethnic minority victims.
These patterns are robust to rich controls for non-racial characteristics and
state sentencing guidelines.
In this article, we argue that the emphasis on prosecutorial
decisions overlooks a critical stage in the production of death penalty
cases: police investigations and arrests. Prosecutors select cases for
capital prosecution from a pool of intentional homicides created
predominantly through police investigations and arrests. To an extent
previously unknown, disparities in charging may reflect antecedent racial
biases in the production of capital-eligible homicides by the police. That
production process is our focus. Accordingly, we back up the research on
racial disparities to an earlier stage of capital case processing: the
production of capital-eligible cases beginning with the identification of
potential defendants by the police. If police investigations themselves
produce racial disparities in arrests, then some residual of these disparities

10

See Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical
Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp, and Some Pathways for
Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269, 1280-81 (2018) (noting that the Court foresaw “that
statistical challenges would not be cabined to death, or to race”); John Charles
Boger, McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes from 1977-1991, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1637,
1638 (2018) (noting that Justice Powell erected “all-but-insuperable future barriers
against statistical proof of discrimination anywhere in the criminal justice system”).
11
See Boger, id. at 1638. See, generally, Amsterdam, supra note 1.
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may skew the investigation and arrests, or clearance, of homicides and in
particular capital-eligible homicides. Any disparity in which Whitevictim homicides are more likely than minority-victim homicides to result
in arrests suggests inequalities in the administration of justice that may be
carried forward and expanded in the production of death sentences and
executions. The answers to these questions go beyond the context of
capital cases. The racial disparities commonly observed in prosecutorial
discretion in capital-eligible murders may, to a considerable extent,
simply reproduce wider racial disparities in police arrests.12
Accordingly, we ask two simple questions here. First, what
policing processes contribute to the supply of cases that are then judged
by prosecutors to be death-eligible? And second, given the racial
disparities in capital punishment, we then ask if racial biases or disparities
in investigations infect those processes. There are obvious policy
implications in the answers to that question, and perhaps constitutional
questions that raise equal protection worries based on racially selective
enforcement. Racially skewed processes that create the supply of capitaleligible cases from the moment of arrest could interact with racially
skewed discretionary decisions by prosecutors to seek death. 13 As a matter
of policy, understanding the crime, social, and policing conditions that
shape those policing processes can contribute to equity in public safety
for this salient subset of cases that often drive public policy and
perceptions of criminal justice.
Using data from the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, we
examine every homicide reported between 1976 and 2009, and find that
homicides with White victims are significantly more likely to be “cleared”
by the arrest of a suspect than are homicides with minority victims. We
estimate a series of hierarchical regressions to show that a substantial
portion of this disparity is explained by social and demographic
characteristics of the county in which homicides take place. Most notably,
counties with large concentrations of minority residents have lower
clearance rates than do predominantly White counties; however, county
characteristics do not fully explain the observed race-of-victim
disparities. We suggest that the police practices that result in the White
victim disparity in these cases reflect broader inequalities in the
12
See, e.g., David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities
in Arrest, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 55, 63-65 (2008).
13
See generally CAROL STEIKER & JORDAN STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2017).

ISSUE 23:3

2018

FALL 2018

POLICE, RACE, AND HOMICIDE

267

administration of justice. Inequalities in policing, such as the
underpolicing of the most serious crimes in the most disadvantaged
communities, coupled with overpolicing of the least serious offenses in
those same places, seem to extend to the initial stages of the production
of death sentences and executions. Implicit in this idea is the theory that
legal processes are influenced by the local ecologies of crime and
punishment, as well as local social and economic conditions. 14 In other
words, the same processes that lead to disparities in crime may also be
endogenous to the policing practices that produce wider disparities in
police contacts and arrests.15 Our findings raise equal protection concerns,
paving the way for further research into the production of capital
homicides and the administration of the death penalty.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows: The next section
reviews the empirical evidence on racial disparities in the charging and
prosecution of capital-eligible homicides. This empirical research on
racial disparities dates back to the 1930s and continues to the present day.
It has identified persistent racial disparities, although these disparities take
different forms based on different combinations of victim and offender
race or ethnicity. Section III shows the methods and data that are the basis
of these analyses and conclusions. Section IV presents the results of a
series of multivariate hierarchical regressions that estimate the
interactions of victim, offender and case characteristics with the social
and legal contexts of the places – counties – where these cases originate.
Implicit in this design is a theory that legal processes are influenced by
14

See generally DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW (1976); DONALD BLACK,
THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE (1980); Marian Borg & Karen Parker,
Mobilizing Law in Urban Areas: The Social Structure of Homicide Clearance Rates, 35
LAW & SOC. REV. 435 (2001); see also John P. Jarvis & Wendy C. Regoeczi, Murder
Clearance Rates: Guest Editors’ Introduction, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 79, 79-80 (2007);
Ashley M. Mancik, Karen F. Parker & Kirk R. Williams, Neighborhood Context and
Homicide Clearance: Estimating the Effects of Collective Efficacy, 22 HOMICIDE STUD.
188, 190-92 (2018).
15
See David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Arrest, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 55, 63-65 (2008); David S. Kirk & Mauri Matsuda, Legal
Cynicism, Collective Efficacy, and the Ecology of Arrest, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 443, 457-60
(2011); David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the
Persistence of Neighborhood Violence, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1190, 1217 (2011); Andrew V.
Papachristos & David Kirk, Changing the Street Dynamic, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 24 (2015); see generally RUTH D. PETERSON, LAUREN J. KRIVO & JOHN HAGAN,
THE MANY COLORS OF CRIME: INEQUALITIES OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN
AMERICA (2006).
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the local ecologies of crime and punishment, as well as local social and
economic conditions.16 The final section locates these results in the
emerging empirical literature on tensions and distrust between citizens
and police that may suppress the ability of law enforcement to effectively
investigate capital-eligible homicides.
BACKGROUND
A. Race and the Furman Moratorium
The 1972 moratorium on executions following Furman v.
Georgia is often cited as the beginning of the modern era of the American
death penalty.17 The Furman court invalidated the death sentencing
regimes of every state and the federal government based, in part, on what
it described as an arbitrary and capricious pattern of sentencing decisions.
Race was one of the factors that animated the concerns of some Justices.
Concurring in the per curiam opinion in Furman, Justice Stewart wrote
that “if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be
sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.” 18
Justice Douglas cited racial disparities as an example of the English
proscription against selective use of the death penalty: “it is ‘cruel and
unusual’ to apply the death penalty . . . selectively to minorities whose
numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but
whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance
general application of the same penalty across the board.”19 Justice Powell
noted in his dissent that racial disparities were still prevalent at the time
of Furman, but cited Maxwell v. Bishop20 to stop short of claiming that
racial bias infected all death sentences imposed on non-White defendants.
The justices cited research on racial disparities in death sentencing
to form their claims about race. Justice Douglas cited the conclusions of

16

See generally BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW, supra note 14; Kenneth J. Litwin
& Yili Xu, The Dynamic Nature of Homicide Clearances: A Multilevel Model
Comparison of Three Time Periods, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 94 (2007); Janice L. Puckett &
Richard J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate Analysis of a
More Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 184-86 (2003).
17
See, e.g., Steven Shatz and Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with
Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
1227, 1229 (2013).
18
408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972).
19
Id. at 245.
20
398 U.S. 262 (1970).
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the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice (“Finally, there is evidence that the imposition
of the death sentence and the exercise of dispensing power by the courts
and the executive follow discriminatory patterns. The death sentence is
disproportionately imposed, and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and
the members of unpopular groups.”) and research by Professor Hugo
Bedau (“Although there may be a host of factors other than race involved
in this frequency distribution, something more than chance has operated
over the years to produce this racial difference.”).
Justice Douglas also relied on research by Professor Marvin
Wolfgang and his colleagues 21 that analyzed the outcomes of 439 death
cases from 1914-1958. Table 3 in the Wolfgang et al. study showed that
88.4% of death cases with Black defendants resulted in execution
compared to 79.8% of White defendants, a statistically significant
difference. The odds ratio in these data of a death sentence for a Black
defendant compared to a White was 1.93, meaning a Black defendant was
nearly twice as likely to receive a death sentence as was a White
defendant. Wolfgang et al. concluded that “..the existence of the
relationship, although not proving differential bias by race . . . over the
years since 1914, strongly suggests that such bias has existed.” Wolfgang
et al. examined felony murders, which (as we describe in this chapter for
the modern era) were the majority of the murder charges. Here, the
disparities were most stark: 94 percent of Black felony murder defendants
were executed, compared to 83 percent of White felony murder
defendants, an odds ratio of 3.10. The authors added an important
observation about frequentist statistics that underscores their conclusion
of systematic bias:
Here, then, is a point at which the lack of statistical significance
carries an important meaning when placed side by side with a
relationship that is significant. The fact that Negros on death row
do not comprise a significantly higher proportion of felony
murderers than do Whites, combined with the fact that a
significantly higher proportion of Negro felony murderers are
executed than are White felony murderers focuses the direction of
the differential treatment. It is the Negro felony murderer more

21

See generally Marvin E., Wolfgang, Arlene Kelly & Hans C. Nolde, Comparison of
the Executed and the Commuted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 301 (1962).
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than any other type of offender who will suffer the death penalty.
(306)
Research published during the 1972-75 Furman moratorium
confirmed the racial disparities that troubled Justices Stewart, Douglas
and Marshall. Professors Marvin Wolfgang and Marc Reidel showed that
Black defendants who killed Whites were at significantly greater risk of
death in the 1950s and 1960s.22 Their unadjusted data show that 49% of
defendants executed for murder during that period were Black, and 89%
of the 455 defendants executed for rape from 1930-1970 were Black.23
B. Racial Disparities from Furman to McCleskey
Most of the death penalty states revised their statutes to respond
to the Court’s critiques. The Supreme Court’s 1975 opinion in Gregg v.
Georgia reinstated capital punishment and set standards for
proportionality review, and procedural standards for constitutional
compliance. 24 Gregg’s hyper-proceduralization of death sentencing was
designed to reduce arbitrariness and racial disparities in capital
punishment. Still, those concerns remained once death sentences and
executions resumed, and they increased starting in the late 1970s.
Not until McCleskey v. Kemp in 1987 did evidence of racial
discrimination in charging and sentencing in capital cases reach the postFurman Supreme Court.25 The evidence presented in McCleskey
elaborated on the evidence cited in Furman. In the runup to McCleskey,
Baldus and Woodworth showed that a Black defendant accused of killing
a White victim (BD-WV) in Georgia was 3.1 times more likely to be
22

See Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death
Penalty, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 123 (1973); Marvin E. Wolfgang
& Marc Reidel, Rape, Race, and the Death Penalty in Georgia, 45 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 658, 662 (1975).
23
See Catherine M. Grosso, Barbara O’Brien, Abijah Taylor & George Woodworth,
Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL
SANCTION 540 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed. 2014).
24
428 US 153 (1976). Two other opinions were issued the same day as Gregg that
further elaborated on constitutional standards. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 42 U.S.
153 (1976) (establishing the “death is different” doctrine that requires distinction of
capital-eligible murders from ‘ordinary’ murders); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(holding that the death penalty for rape of an adult woman was grossly disproportionate
and excessive punishment and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).
25
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 299-319.
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sentenced to death than any defendant accused of killing a Black victim
(BV) in the years immediately after Gregg.26 Baldus and Woodworth also
showed that the disparities were not uniform across cases of varying
severity of aggravation in the murder. Disparities were greatest in the midrange of aggravation severity, where charging discretion was greatest.
The evidence was introduced at trial in McCleskey, but was
unpersuasive to the McCleskey majority at the Supreme Court. Despite
the findings of the Baldus study (later confirmed in a 1990 General
Accounting Office review 27), the Court affirmed McCleskey’s death
sentence. The majority adopted a standard of discriminatory purpose,
citing Washington v. Davis (1976).28 Warren McCleskey’s death sentence
was affirmed by the Court, despite the Court's acceptance of the evidence
of discrimination in death charging and sentencing in Georgia in the years
before McCleskey’s trial and sentencing.
Perhaps the McCleskey Court lacked a more detailed elaboration
of the evidence. The 1990 GAO review included a study by Baldus et al.
examining racial disparities in 2,400 capital-eligible cases from 19731980.29 That period spanned the Furman moratorium and the Gregg
holding that created the basic architecture of the current death penalty
jurisprudence. Together with the 1983 article, this evidence was the basis
for Warren McCleskey’s claim of racial discrimination charging and
death sentencing in Georgia. These studies showed that defendants
accused of murdering White victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive
a death sentence than a similarly situated defendant whose victims were
Black. 30
But it is unlikely that the additional evidence would have
26

Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra note 7, at 709. The study showed both BD-WV
disparities and BD disparities regardless of victim race in Georgia in the decade preceding
the Furman moratorium. The Gregg architecture seems to have failed to curb racial
discrimination in charging, notably in Georgia where Furman, Gregg and McCleskey
originated.
27
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFF., 101ST CONG., GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN DISPARITIES (1990).
28
426 U.S. 229, 230 (holding that an official act is not unconstitutional solely because
it has a racially discriminatory impact regardless of discriminatory intent).
29
DAVID BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH, AND CHARLES A. PULASKI, EQUAL JUSTICE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 2-4 (1990) (reporting
evidence of statistical discrimination in the selection of cases for capital prosecution in
the period between the Furman and Gregg decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court).
30
Id. at 4. The GAO study, citing Baldus and Woodworth (1990) and other studies,
found the evidence at that time of bias based on race of defendants to be equivocal.
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mattered. Explaining his position in a memo to Justice Marshall, Justice
Scalia drew a distinction between purposeful discrimination toward a
defendant and the “unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and
antipathies” that would produce discrimination. 31 Justice Powell’s
majority opinion superficially accepted McCleskey’s detailed, rigorous
and unrebutted evidence of racial discrimination, but “appears to have
contorted the Court’s prior Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, erecting all-but-insuperable future barriers against
statistical proof of racial discrimination anywhere within the criminal
justice system.”32 The Court at that time simply was hostile to social
science and statistical evidence of discrimination in death sentencing. 33
Professor Boger finds the hostility emerging a year earlier in Lockhart v.
McCree, 34 where Chief Justice Burger was reported to claim in conference
that he was “not going to be ‘bossed around’ by social scientists.”35
These setbacks failed to deter other researchers from adding to the
empirical evidence of race discrimination in the selection of death-eligible
cases for prosecution. Studies after McCleskey through the late 1980s
elaborated on the disparities cited both by the Furman court and by Baldus
et al.36 The 1990 GAO systematic review – an “evaluative synthesis” of
research on racial disparities in post-Furman death sentencing and
31

Memorandum from Antonin Scalia to the Conference Re: No. 84 6811, McCleskey v.
Kemp (from Thurgood Marshall Papers) (Jan. 6, 1987).
32
Boger, supra note 10, at 1638.
33
See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1280. Justice Powell disguised his hostility to social
science as a policy argument: “Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice
process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the
discretion has been abused False Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly
insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case
acted with discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297. But Powell’s interest
went further to shut down empirical claims of discrimination in criminal justice matters:
“. . . if we accepted McCleskey’s claim . . . we could soon be faced with similar claims
as to other types of penalty” and he foresaw claims based on “unexplained discrepancies
that correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even to gender.” McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 315-17.
34
See Boger, supra note 10, at 1672-73 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986)).
35
The McCree Court rejected a robust body of experimental evidence showing that
excluding jurors opposed to the death penalty at the guilt phase biased deliberations at
the penalty phase toward the state’s view. See id. at 1671-72 (citing EDWARD LAZARUS,
CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE
THE SUPREME COURT 189 (1998)).
36
See Grosso et al., supra note 23, at 525-77.
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executions – reported consistent evidence of a race-of-victim (RV)
disparity: 82% of the studies they reviewed reported that defendants who
murdered Whites were significantly more likely to be sentenced to death.
The effect was observed at all stages of the criminal justice system,
beginning with the charging decision and continuing through plea
bargaining and sentencing. The GAO was more equivocal on race-ofdefendant (RD) evidence. On average, there was a RD effect, but it varied
by study features. As an aside, the studies didn’t examine disparities in
arrests for death-eligible murders, the focus of this chapter, leaving open
questions about the mechanisms and racial disparities in the production of
capital cases.
C. Racial Disparities After McCleskey
Several post-McCleskey cases were included in the 1990 GAO
“evaluative synthesis,” demonstrating that racial disparities were not
uncommon beyond the 1983 Baldus and Woodworth study. Grosso et al.
reviewed 36 post-1990 studies on racial disparities in charging and
sentencing.37 They observed the same patterns that were reported by the
GAO. They reported race-of-victim effects in 24 studies across 13 states
and in the U.S. Armed Forces. A mandated proportionality review by the
Administrative Office of the Court in New Jersey also reported no race
effects, but only after excluding the influence of county factors.38 Studies
in North Carolina and Tennessee reached the same conclusions. 39 Four
other studies showed race of defendant effects, without assessing any
concurrent race of victim effects, including an earlier federal death
penalty study40 and the Baldus et al. of the death penalty in the U.S.
Armed Forces.41 Four studies, including a 2006 analysis of federal death
penalty cases, showed no race effects. 42 A mandated proportionality
37

See id. at Appendix A.
DAVID BAIME, NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMISSION: REPORT TO THE NEW
JERSEY SUPREME COURT SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT (2001),
available at https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/baimereport.pdf.
39
See Grosso et al., supra note 23, at 525-77.
40
U.S. Department of Justice, Survey of the Federal Death Penalty System (1988-2000)
(2000). U.S. Department of Justice (2001) Survey of the Federal Death Penalty System:
Supplementary Data, Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review (2001).
41
See David Baldus, Catherine Grosso, George Woodworth & Rebecca Newell, Racial
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United
States Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1227-1336
(2012).
42
See, STEPHEN KLEIN, RICHARD BERK, AND LAURA HICKMAN, RACE AND
38
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review by the Administrative Office of the Court in New Jersey also
reported no race effects. Studies in North Carolina and Tennessee reached
the same conclusions.
Race of victim effects were shown in 24 studies in 13 states and
in the U.S. Armed Forces.43 Not only are race effects identified in WV
cases as well as BD/WV cases, but at least one study showed that BD/BV
cases actually “pull strongly in the opposite direction.”44 O’Brien et al.
show that clearance rates for BD/BV cases are 2.6 times lower than for all
other victim race/ defendant race combinations, and that juries were
nearly 80% less likely to impose death sentences in the few WD/BV
cases. 45
In addition to the state studies, a few studies identified race of
victim (RV) effects in multi-jurisdictional (states) studies, while others
identified the same effects in county-level or State sub-region studies.
Others either found no race effects or challenged earlier studies showing
race effects. Paternoster found the same in South Carolina 46 and again
(with colleagues) in Maryland. 47 Professors Berk and Hickman reanalyzed Maryland data using alternate methods to conclude that race
differences, whether by victim or offender race, were marginal to nonexistent, after controlling for the influence of race-correlated factors.48
However, Professor Sherrod Thaxton found race of victim (RV) effects in
Georgia capital punishment data from 1994-2005 after using race-specific

THE DECISION TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY IN FEDERAL CASES (2006) at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR389.
43
See Grosso et al., supra note 23, at 538 (citing David Baldus, Catherine Grosso,
George Woodworth, and Richard. Newell, Racial Discrimination in the Administration
of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United States Armed Forces (1984-2005),
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1228 (2012)).
44
Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso, George Woodworth, & Abijah Taylor,
Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and Sentencing in North Carolina,
1990-2009, 94 N.C.L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2016).
45
Id.
46
Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek
the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983).
47
Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Sarah Bacon, & Andrew Ditchfield, Justice by
geography and race: The administration of the death penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4
U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1 (2004).
48
Richar A. Berk, and Matthew L. Hickman, Statistical Difficulties in Determining the
Role of Race in Capital Cases: A Re-Analysis of Data From the State of Maryland, 20 J.
Quantitative Criminology 365, 365-67 (2005).
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models in response to the analytic concerns cited by Berk and Hickman. 49
The 2017 Pennsylvania capital punishment commission study found
neither race of victim nor race of defendant effects across the state, but
reported large disparities in both race of victim and race of defendant
effects in charging and sentencing when disaggregated by county. 50
The most recent study, by Professor Glenn Pierce and colleagues,
showed significant race of victim (RV) effects in Oklahoma in capitaleligible cases but no race of defendant effects in cases from 1990-2012.51
This study also showed strong interactions between victim race and victim
gender, with female and White victim homicides resulting in death
sentences anywhere from 3.22 times to 8.68 times more likely than for
male or non-White victims. Defendant’s race (RD) by itself did not
correlate with the likelihood of a death sentence, the probability of a death
sentence for a nonWhite defendant charged with killing a White victim
(5.8%) was more than triple the probability of a death sentence for a White
defendant charged with killing a non-White victim (1.8%).52
D. The Production of Capital Homicides
None of the past studies on disparities in capital murder cases
questioned whether there was bias at the source: the production of capital
homicides through police investigations and arrests. Nearly all the studies
of racial disparities in capital punishment begin their analysis at the point
of prosecutorial charging decisions. These analyses begin with a docket
of cases presented to prosecutors or courts to determine whether to charge
them as first or second degree murder, and then, to determine death
eligibility. Some studies use data on murder rates by race of defendant or
victim as external benchmarks to assess racial disparities in charging and
sentencing, but those are exceptions. 53 Others simply look at the pool of

49
Sherod Thaxton, Disentangling Disparity: Exploring Racially Disparate Effect and
Treatment in Capital Charging, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 95 (2018).
50
See JOHN KRAMER, JEFFERY ULMER & GARY ZAJAC, REPORT TO PENNSYLVANIA
INTERBRANCH COMMISSION FOR GENDER, RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT DECISIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA: 2000-2010 IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL,
ETHNIC
AND
OTHER
DISPARATE
IMPACTS
(2017),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3148037.
51
See Glenn L. Pierce, Michael L. Radelet & Susan Sharp, Race and Death Sentencing
for Oklahoma Homicides Committed Between 1990 and 2012, 107 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 733, 746-50 (2017).
52
Id.
53
Id.

FAGEN & GELLER

276

FALL 2018

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

Vol. 23:2

cases and use internal benchmarks to identify differences by race or
ethnicity during the selection process. None begin with the entire pool of
murders to identify selection processes at the source of the pool of
potential eligibles: police arrest decisions. 54
Accordingly, we ask a simple question here: what policing
processes create the supply of cases that are judged by prosecutors to be
death-eligible? Given the racial disparities in capital punishment, we next
ask if racial biases or disparities in investigations infect those processes.
There are obvious policy implications in the answers to that question, and
perhaps equal protection concerns based on racially selective
enforcement. If the processes by which a supply of capital cases is
produced via arrest from the overall supply of murders are racially
skewed, this could suggest mechanisms that would influence the racial
makeup of the subset of cases eligible for capital prosecution, and could
interact with discretionary decisions of prosecutors to seek death. 55As a
matter of policy, understanding the crime, social and policing conditions
that shape those processes can contribute to equity in public safety for the
subset of cases that often drive public policy and perceptions of criminal
justice.
1. Homicide Clearance Rates
Police clearance rates – the percentage of known crimes that result
in an arrest of a suspected offender – are central to this question. The

54

See, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir. 2015) (redefining a selective
prosecution case as a selective enforcement case based on the role of law enforcement in
assembling the pool of potentially eligible suspects: “If the initial inquiry gives the judge
reason to think that suspects of another race, and otherwise similarly situated, would not
have been offered the opportunity for a [fake robbery opportunity], it might be
appropriate to require [law enforcement] to disclose, in confidence, their criteria for [the
fake conspiracies.] Analysis of the targeting criteria (and whether agents followed those
rules in practice) could shed light on whether an initial suspicion of race discrimination
in this case is justified. . . If after that inquiry the judge continues to think that racial
discrimination may have led to this prosecution, more information could be gathered”).
55
See also Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2
(2013) (analyzing racial disparities in prosecutorial decision-making empirically); see
also BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, TECHNICAL REPORT:
PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY (2014), available at
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/race-andprosecution-in-manhattan/legacy_downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattantechnical.pdf.
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police produce a supply of capital-eligible and other murder cases by
“clearing” homicides via arrest. However, the ability of police officers to
clear a given homicide case is multiply determined, not only by the
complexity of the homicide itself, but by institutional and political factors
that may enhance or undermine police department efficiency.
While clearance rates provide an objective measure of police
performance, empirical studies of clearance rates across police agencies
and within them over time suggest that clearance rates may be picking up
noise about the police organization in addition to the skills of
investigators. For example, some researchers challenge the value of using
police clearance rates as a measure of police effectiveness, claiming
invariance in homicide rates despite changes in workload or personnel. 56
Factors such as the policing model, resource allocation, personnel
assignments, management mechanisms such as merit systems,
investigative tactics, information systems, and inter-agency cooperation
can all influence clearance rates. 57 In Ghettoside, for example, Jill Leovy
describes the difficulties in completing homicide investigations in the
poorer areas of Los Angeles with higher homicide rates, where
investigations are complicated by lower staffing and the self-selection of
more experienced detectives to work in more visible and politically
glamorous divisions that investigate higher profile cases. 58 Other
researchers challenge the claim that workload and staffing levels impact
police clearance rates, claiming invariance in homicide clearance rates
despite changes in workload or personnel allocations.59 However, all
these studies leave open the question of how officer skillsets and
experience, or perhaps institutional or agency preferences, may affect
clearance rates.
Much of what we know about police clearance rates is based on
arrests for violent crimes in large cities. 60 That may not help us theorize
56

See, e.g., Graham Ousey & Matthew R. Lee, To Know the Unknown: The Decline in
Homicide Clearance Rates, 1980–2000, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV. 141 (2009).
57
See Timothy G. Keel, John P. Jarvis & Yvonne E. Muirhead, An Exploratory Analysis
of Factors Affecting Homicide Investigations: Examining the Dynamics of Murder
Clearance Rates, 13 HOMICIDE STUD. 50 (2009); Arianna Ornaghi, Essays in Political
Economy,
M.I.T.,
DEPT.
OF
ECON.
(2017),
available
at
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113994.
58
See J ILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015).
59
See Ousey & Lee, supra note 57, at 150.
60
See, e.g., Borg & Parker, supra note 14, at 435, 458; Jeffrey J. Roth, Property Crime
Clearance in Small Jurisdictions: Police and Community Factors, 43 CRIM. JUST. REV.
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what policing factors matter for capital-eligible homicides. Although
homicides are concentrated in urban areas, there is no reason to suspect
that capital-eligible homicides are clustered disproportionately in those
areas.61 In fact, these cases appear well beyond cities as well as within
them. For example, the Atlanta Journal Constitution reported in its series
on capital punishment in Georgia that death sentences were sought in all
49 of Georgia’s judicial districts between 1995 and 2004, resulting in 29
death sentences that also were spread out across the state. 62 And as
discussed earlier, Professor Raymond Paternoster found the same in South
Carolina63 and (with colleagues) in Maryland. 64
The few studies of error rates in death penalty convictions show
much the same spread, with cases spread across counties both urban and
rural in both densely and sparsely populated states. 65 Despite the spatial
spread in homicides, extralegal factors in both large and small places
influence error rates. These extralegal factors include: homicide rates,
poor clearance rates, racial composition of both murders and the local
area, and overloaded and inefficient criminal justice systems. 66 This
spatial spread in capital-eligible prosecutions, and the patterns of
clearance rates for homicides, suggests the need for extensions of the
theories of social disorganization in urban settings that have been
dominant in studies of homicides and their clearance rates.
Three lessons thread through the studies of homicide clearance
rates with implications for explaining clearance rates of capital-eligible
homicides. First, extralegal factors that explain homicide clearance rates
generally – especially victim race or ethnicity – may differ from the
477, 478 (2018).
61
See Robert J. Sampson, Race and Criminal Violence: A Demographically
Disaggregated Analysis of Urban Homicide, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 47, 63 (1985).
62
See Bill Rankin, Heather Vogell, Sonji Jacobs & Megan Clarke, A Matter of Life and
Death: Death Still Arbitrary, ATL. J. CONSTIT., Sept. 23, 2007,
https://www.myajc.com/news/state—regional/from-2007-matter-life-and-death-deathstill-arbitrary/uQMik03eSLJ7VlI4wvUZnN/.
63
See Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to
Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983).
64
See generally Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Sarah Bacon & Andrew
Ditchfield, Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in
Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1 (2004).
65
See, e.g., Andrew Gelman, James S. Liebman, Valerie West & Alexander Kiss, A
Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United
States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209 (2004).
66
See id.
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extralegal factors that explain clearance rates in other types of cases –
specifically, offender race.67 This leads us to focus on victim race as well
as defendant race, consistent with the evidence on racial disparities in
death penalty prosecutions and sentences. Second, clearance rates are
subject to extralegal contextual influences: the racial composition of
homicides and of the place where homicides take place, rates of poverty
and inequality, segregation and stratification, and other correlates of
homicide and other violent crimes. 68 Again, whether these factors apply
to capital-eligible cases, a distinct subset of homicides, is the question for
this project. Third, the heterogeneity of homicide, from gang conflicts to
felony murders to intimate partner homicides to drug transactions gone
awry, suggests that police will be challenged to achieve consistent and
equitable clearance rates across these categories. Victim cooperation is
likely to vary.
2. Variation in Homicide Clearance Rates
Long-term trends show that police have had increasing difficulty
in clearing homicides. Homicide clearance rates have declined from 95%
in 1951, a lower crime era, to 60% in 2012, 69 two decades after the peak
homicide rate in the U.S. in 1991. 70 From 1961, three decades of
cascading homicide rates ensued, with spikes in 1972, 1981, and 1991 that
each suggested a pattern of a disease epidemic. 71 The surge in homicides,
67
See generally Catherine Y. Lee, The Value of Life: Multiple Regression and Event
History Analyses of Homicide Clearance in Los Angeles County, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 527
(2005).
68
See, e.g., Marian J. Borg & Karen F. Parker, Mobilizing Law in Urban Areas: The
Social Structure of Homicide Clearance Rates, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 435 (2001);
Kenneth J. Litwin & Yili Xu, The Dynamic Nature of Homicide Clearances: A Multilevel
Model Comparison of Three Time Periods, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 94 (2007); Janice L.
Puckett & Richard J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate
Analysis of a Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171 (2003);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An
Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 262 (2007).
69
See Paul A. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty
Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97
B.U.L. REV. 687, 709 (at Fig. 2).
70
See RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 466 (2012).
71
See Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring & June Kim, Declining Homicide in New
York: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1307 (1998); ROTH,
supra note 71, at 463-66; Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson & Garth Davies, Social
Contagion of Violence, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 688, 69495 (Daniel Flannery, Alexander Vazsonyi & Irwin Waldman eds., 2007).
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especially in urban areas, may be one of several factors that influenced
the decline, with strains on police resources simply exceeding the
investigatory bandwidth of many agencies. Aki Roberts reports that
firearm homicides have the lowest clearance rates compared to other
homicide types, and that police workload also suppresses clearance
rates.72 These trends suggest that the cascading epidemics of gun
homicides have in fact reduced clearance rates.
Still, even within this declining rate, we suggest that other factors
may also contribute to the difficulty in homicide clearance. Two
competing theories posit how police investigation of homicides might
vary by victim characteristics. 73 Professor Black notes unequal
application of the law by “vertical location,” suggesting that offenses
against upper-status individuals receive more legal attention (either
criminal or civil) than offenses against lower-status individuals.74
Historically this stratification has operated across a variety of dimensions
– wealth, social class, gender, and perhaps most notably, race. Professor
Nick Peterson shows that homicides in predominantly Black and Latino
neighborhoods are less likely to be cleared. 75 He goes on to suggest that
these area demographics may exert larger effects than victim race in
explaining the neighborhood context of homicide clearance. At the least,
victim race, a critical factor in capital-eligible homicide charging
disparities, seems to interact with neighborhood structure to shape
clearance rates and in turn, the supply of capital-eligible cases.
Others posit instead that the law is applied based solely on the
extent of harm suffered by the victim at the hands of the offender, and that
demographic or socioeconomic disparities in clearance or other legal
responses are driven primarily by systematic differences in crimes against
different social groups whose variable social organization poses uneven

72

See generally Aki Roberts, Adjusting Rates of Homicide Clearance by Arrest for
Investigation Difficulty: Modeling Incident- and Jurisdiction-Level Obstacles, 19
HOMICIDE STUD. 273, 275, 284 (2015); see also Litwin & Xu, supra note 69; Janice L.
Puckett & Richard J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate
Analysis of a Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 17193.
73
See Roberts, supra note 69; Litwin & Xu, supra note 69; Puckett & Lundman, supra
note 69.
74
BLACK, supra note 16, at 16-21; see also Borg & Parker, supra note 14.
75
Nick Peterson, Neighborhood Context and Unsolved Murders: The Social Ecology of
Homicide Investigations, 27 POLICING & SOC’Y 372 (2017).
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challenges in clearing homicide cases.76 For example, Regoeczi et al. posit
that female-victim homicides are likely to be cleared more quickly than
male-victim homicides, primarily because women are more likely to be
killed by an intimate partner.77 Felony murders, in contrast, are less likely
to be cleared since there is no victim-offender relationship on which
investigators can build a case. Similarly, they suggest that homicides of
children may have higher clearance rates because children are more likely
than other homicide victims to be killed by somebody they know.
Professor Roberts shows that homicides of a family member or friend are
far more likely to be cleared by arrest than homicides of strangers or
murders where the victim-offender relationship is unknown. Relatedly,
she demonstrates that gun killings are less likely to be cleared by arrest. 78
Homicide clearance rates are also influenced by the presence of
and cooperation from witnesses and others who know the neighborhood
and circumstances of a murder.79 Witness and neighborhood cooperation
generally covaries with pre-existing relationships between the police and
local residents or merchants. In neighborhoods that are saturated with
police and where policing is aggressive, cooperation with police tends to
be constrained because neighborhood residents see the police as unfair,
disrespectful, and illegal.80
76

See, e.g., Michael Gottfredson & Michael J. Hindelang, A Study of the Behavior of
the Law, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 3, 15-16 (1979).
77
See Wendy C. Regoeczi & John P. Jarvis, Beyond the Social Production of Homicide
Rates: Extending Social Disorganization Theory to Explain Homicide Case Outcomes,
30 JUST. Q. 983-1014 (2013).
78
Roberts, supra note 69, at 284.
79
See CHARLES WELLFORD & JAMES CRONIN, AN ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES AFFECTING
THE CLEARANCE OF HOMICIDES : A MULTISTATE STUDY (1999), available at
http://www.jrsa.org/pubs/reports/homicides_report.pdf; see generally Patrick J. Carr,
Laura Napolitano, & Jessica Keating, We Never Call the Cops and Here is Why: A
Qualitative Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighborhoods, 45
CRIMINOLOGY 445, 450-51 (2007); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING : CRIMINAL
INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009).
80
See generally Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Street Stops and Police
Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 751-85 (2014); Jeffrey Fagan, Tom R. Tyler, & Tracey L.
Meares, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York, Comparing the Democratic
Governance of Police Intelligence (Jacqueline E. Ross & Thierry Delpeuch, eds., 2016),
203-31; RICK TRINKNER & TOM R. TYLER, WHY CHILDREN FOLLOW RULES : LEGAL
SOCIALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMACY (2018); Mark T. Berg, Eric A.
Stewart, Jonathan Intravia, Patricia Y. Warren & Ronald L. Simons, Cynical Streets:
Neighborhood Social Processes and Perceptions of Criminal Injustice, 54 CRIMINOLOGY
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That style of policing tends to take place in neighborhoods with
higher crime rates, yet there also is evidence that race effects in police
cooperation extend beyond race-crime correlations.81 For example,
clearance rates are lower in neighborhoods with high concentrations of
economic disadvantage, residential instability, Black and Hispanic
concentrations, and high unemployment rates - homicide rates
notwithstanding. 82 In contrast, cohesion among neighbors seems to
improve homicide clearance rates net of the homicide rate. 83 In other
words, homicide clearance seems to covary with both structural and social
organizational features of neighborhoods, as well as with the ties between
residents and police.
Aki Roberts concluded that “homicide arrest clearance is greatly
affected by factors beyond police control, such as situational
characteristics of homicide incidents, jurisdictional characteristics that
affect citizen cooperation, and police agency workload.”84 But clearance
rates may also be affected by factors within the control of police
departments. Regoeczi and Jarvis’ study of Cleveland police data found
that witness cooperation interacted with community characteristics in
predicting clearance, so that the presence of a witness increased clearance
likelihood only in communities with low levels of social
disorganization.85 But if cooperation is withheld in heavily policed
neighborhoods, then clearance rates in the most disadvantaged and
highest crime areas are likely to be lower. 86
Peterson points out that race is implicated in lower cooperation
rates in homicide investigations. 87 But the question for us is how. Lower
cooperation rates reflect alienation from the police, often in response to
520 (2016); Monica C. Bell, Situational Trust: How Disadvantaged Mothers Reconceive
Legal Cynicism, 50 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 314, 315-18, 338 (2016).
81
See, e.g., VICTOR RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS
(2011); NIKKI JONES, ‘THE REGULAR ROUTINE’: PROACTIVE POLICING AND ADOLESCENT
DEVELOPMENT AMONG YOUNG, POOR BLACK MEN : NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD AND
ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT (2014); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY,
VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (1999).
82
See Peterson, supra note 76.
83
See Mancik et al., supra note 14.
84
See Roberts, supra note 69, at 292.
85
See Regoeczi & Jarvis, supra note 78.
86
See Tom R. Tyler, Phillip Atiba Goff, & Robert J. MacCoun, The Impact of
Psychological Science on Policing in the United States: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy,
and Effective Law Enforcement, 16 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 75, 80-86 (2015).
87
Peterson, supra note 76.
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incidents of police violence. Professor Desmond and his colleagues
showed sharp declines in 911 reports in Milwaukee following a police
shooting of an unarmed Black citizen. 88 Those events seem to churn what
is a reservoir of discontent that distances citizens from police, and it
happens particularly when they are most needed. It is worrisome that the
same neighborhood conditions that elevate murder and other violent
crime rates seem to also reduce citizen cooperation with police, a
problematic intersection that compounds each of these processes. 89 When
homicides remain unsolved, the killer is free to kill again, compounding
the alienation from police and skewing the racial distribution of homicide
clearance rates.
Several processes, then, combine to create and shape the supply
of capital cases. These dynamics churn both in institutions and
communities, and provide a new perspective on the robust racial disparity
in death penalty charging and sentencing. The effectiveness of police in
clearing homicides creates the front-end of a supply of cases eligible for
prosecution, which instantiates the racial distribution that is presented to
prosecutors, who then exercise their own discretion that carries forward
(if not expands) racial disparities.90 Quite simply, police receive less help
from citizens in neighborhoods with high Black homicide victimization
rates. The clearance rate – the gate in this process – is shaped in part by
differences in the relationships of police with communities of color,
which impacts those communities' willingness to cooperate in criminal
investigations.91 These relationships also effect the estrangement many
communities of color have generally from the agents of formal (legal)
social control over their lives. 92 While these tensions have been observed

88

See Matthew Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Violence
and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857-76 (2016).
89
See LEOVY, supra note 59, at 74-81; Benjamin Mueller Mueller & Al Baker, Rift
Between Officers and Residents as Killings Persist in South Bronx, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31,
2016), http://nyti.ms/2jVye66.
90
See Baldus et al., supra note 7; Catherine Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn
Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson
North Carolina Capital Trials, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1548-55 (2012); Sonja B. Starr &
M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013)
91
See Jeffrey Fagan & Daniel Richman, Understanding Recent Spikes and Longer
Trends in American Murders, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2017).
92
See Bell, supra note 81, at 315; Charis Kubrin & Ronald Weitzer, New Directions in
Social Disorganization Theory, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 374, 382-84 (2003).
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broadly in cities such as Los Angeles, 93 Chicago,94 and New York,95 their
effects on the supply of capital cases are not well understood. We address
that question in this analysis.
E. This Article
This article provides a first glimpse at the flow of cases and
examines the factors that may explain the persistence of racial
lopsidedness in capital charging. We combine and analyze data on capitaleligible homicides from 1976-2009 to address three issues. First, we
estimate the extent of racial disparities in clearance rates for capitaleligible homicides. This requires, as a predicate step, that we identify the
subset of homicides that are capital-eligible. While there are numerous
studies on racial disparity in charging and sentencing, there are almost
none that identify the universe of capital-eligible cases from which
prosecutor select cases for capital prosecution. It is this supply function
that is the focus of this paper. In keeping with the limited prior work on
this question, we examine disparities by both victim and offender race.
Second, we identify state and county factors that predict and
explain these differentials. There is a long tradition in both law and
criminology of looking to social structural factors, especially racial
composition of communities and local crime conditions, to explain racial
disparity in sentencing.96 However, only a few studies have asked whether
93

See generally LEOVY, supra note 59.
See generally, CITY OF CHICAGO, MAYOR’S POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE (2016), available at
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_161.pdf.
95
See, e.g., Al Baker & Benjamin Mueller, A Shooting, The Hospital, and Months Later,
A
Homicide,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
6,
2018),
available
at
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/nyregion/murder-in-the-40-south-bronxshooting.html; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do
People Help the Police Fight Crime in their Communities? 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231,
244-45 (2008).
96
See also David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidence from the US Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285 (2001); Brian D. Johnson,
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Sentencing Departures Across Modes of Conviction, 41
CRIMINOLOGY 449 (2003); Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial
Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion
and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729 (2012); Kyle Rozema &
Max M. Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad Cop: An Analysis of Chicago Civilian
Allegations of Police Misconduct (U. Chicago, Working Paper 2016), available at
94
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these factors specifically influence rates of capital sentencing. 97 In this
study, we examine these factors as they interact with the earliest stage in
this process: police investigation and arrest of homicide suspects. This is
a particularly sensitive step in creating the supply of capital-eligible
defendants, since we are now aware—compared, for example, to the era
of the McCleskey opinion—of the fault lines in police investigations that
can lead to error rates and wrongful convictions. 98
Third, we estimate the effect of the presence of a valid death
statute on the clearance rates of capital-eligible homicides. The presence
of a death statute could incentivize police to clear capital-eligible cases
more so than ordinary homicides. Community pressures, even if variable
from one community to the next, provide a political incentive to call
offenders in high-visibility crimes to account. Where police and other
political actors express a preference for harsher punishment, creating a
flow of capital-eligible cases satisfies important constituencies. In
instances where the justice system may be weak or inefficient, the
production of a salient capital-eligible case can shift the community and
political perspective of the police from their inadequacies to their
heroism. In studying mistakes or reversal in capital cases, Professor
Gelman and colleagues observed that such inefficiencies can lead to high
error rates.99 Here, we estimate whether the robust racial disparities in
eligibility and death sentencing can be explained in part by the incentives
to the police of the presence of a death capital-eligible cases.

https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2866696.
97
Jeffrey Fagan & Raymond Paternoster, Address at Annual Meeting of the American
Society of Criminology: Social Context and Proportionality of Capital Punishment in
Georgia after McCleskey (Nov. 17, 2010). For a review, see Sherod Thaxton,
Disentangling Disparity, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming).
98
James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Garth Davies, A Broken System:
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, (Colum. L. School, Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 15,
2000); James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Andrew Gelman, Valerie West, Garth Davies,
& Alexander Kiss, A Broken System, Part II: Why There is So Much Error in Capital
Cases, and What Can Be Done About It (Colum. L. School, 2010), available at
www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/; Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need
for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41
HOUSTON L. REV. 1281-1318 (2004).
99
See also Andrew Gelman, James S. Liebman, Valerie West & Alexander Kiss, A
Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United
States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 224, 240-241 (at Table 2) (2004); see also,
James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition:
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000).
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The remainder of this essay proceeds in four sections. First, we
describe the methods to assemble the database. This includes the creation
of a classification model to identify which homicides are potentially
capital-eligible in a universe of cases where many of the statutory
aggravators that make a case capital-eligible are only partially measured.
Next, we describe the data sources and measures from which we address
the three issues for this chapter. The results are discussed next. We
conclude with a discussion of the implications and importance of bringing
police into our understanding of capital punishment, and of what this may
mean for its jurisprudence.
METHODS
A. Data
1. Homicides
We analyze homicide data from the Supplementary Homicide
Reports (SHR), part of the Uniform Crime Reports produced annually by
the U.S. Department of Justice, from 1976-2009. 100 Case reports are
submitted by law enforcement agencies using a standardized coding
format. The SHR includes files organized at the incident level, the victim
level, and the offender level. We focus on incident-level data in order to
provide a more precise estimate of incident clearance rates. Homicides are
reported in the SHR along with the state and county in which they take
place, along with their reporting agency (also known as ORI). 101 We use
a recent update of the SHR dataset that expands in two ways on the
archived data.102 First, data is included for states such as Florida that
previously had not participated in the SHR reporting program. Second,
multiple imputation methods are used to adjust for missing data from the
archived files. 103
100

U.S. DEPT. JUST., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORTS,
available at https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/addendum-for-submitting-cargo-theft-data/shr.
101
ORIs, in turn, match states and counties to their Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS) codes using the Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk
(National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, 2005), which permit states and counties to
be associated with Census data and data from other Federal datasets. Homicides are,
accordingly, matched to Census population and socioeconomic data on the counties in
which they take place, interpolated for intra-census years.
102
James Alan Fox & Emma E. Fridel, Supplementary Homicide Reports, MultiplyImputed Database, 1976-2016 Cumulative File (Northeastern U. 2017).
103
See, e.g., Jonathan A.C. Sterne et al., Multiple Imputation for Missing Data in
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From 1976-2016, the SHR file include 613,602 homicides. We
report on the rate of capital eligibility for that period, by type of homicide.
However, we report detailed information on clearance rates for a shorter
period from 1976-2009. We use the shorter period due to the availability
of census data on county characteristics for that period. In the 1976-2009
period, there were 585,368 murders and non-negligent homicides reported
in the 50 states between 1976 and 2009. Of those, only 21 (<.01%) could
not be matched to counties; these were excluded from the analysis. 104
After the exclusions of the non-matched cases, our resulting analysis
sample includes 584,189 homicides between 1976 and 2009.
2. Case Characteristics
The SHR includes information on the race, gender and age of both
offenders and victims, including multiple victims and offenders in such
incidents. However, this dataset did not include information on victim or
offender ethnicity, although there was information on victim and offender
race. Accordingly, our estimates of race-specific clearance rates are based
on comparisons of Black, White, and Other Race victims. Hispanic
victims are included in all three categories, based on the identification by
the agencies reporting the data.
The county and state where the homicide occurred in included, as
well as the police agency submitting the report. The SHR also specifies
the means of killing (firearm, other). The data also includes information
on the “situation” and “circumstances” of each case, from which we
determine capital-eligibility.
3. Capital Eligibility
We use data from the Death Penalty Information Center to note
whether each homicide took place in a state-year combination with a valid
death penalty statute. Within the states, the definition of a capital-eligible
homicide is determined from an integration of narrow and expansive
capital-eligibility statutes. Death eligibility varies extensively by state,
particularly in the range of factors that satisfy the requirement of
specificity of aggravators.105 Accordingly, we identify homicides as
Epidemiological and Clinical Research: Potential and Pitfalls, 338 BMJ 338-93 (2009).
104
We also exclude 5,967 homicides in the District of Columbia. We exclude an
additional 1,171 homicides in Alaska, which lacks a county structure like that of the other
49 states.
105
See Jonathan Simon & Christine Spaulding, Token of Our Esteem: Aggravating
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eligible for the death penalty using the procedures developed by
Professors Fagan, Zimring, and Geller, based on the recurrent language
of capital-eligible homicides across states.106
We combine the statutes from three states to compose a definition
of capital-eligible homicides: Maryland (before abolition of capital
punishment in 2008),107 Texas,108 and California.109 The California statute
is similar to the Maryland statute in the configuration of aggravators.
What makes the California statute unique and quite expansive is its
extensive array of granularly defined “special circumstances” that qualify
a murder as death-eligible. 110 For this study, we focus on one of
California’s special circumstances: murder by a street gang member.
Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE (Austin Sarat ed., 1999) 81-116.
106
Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring & Amanda Geller, Capital Homicide and Capital
Murder: Market Share and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1803, 1814-16 (2006).
107
1978 MD. LAWS 3 (amended by 1979 MD. LAWS 521). A person is death-eligible if
he commits murder in the first degree, and (a) the victim of the murder was a law
enforcement officer, (b) the defendant committed the murder when confined in a
correctional institution, (c) the defendant committed the murder while trying to escape
from custody, (d) the victim was taken in the course of a kidnapping or abduction, (e) the
victim was a child abducted in violation of §3-503 (a) (1) MD. CODE ANN. (2002), (f)
the defendant murdered pursuant to an agreement for enumeration, (g) the defendant
employed another who killed for remuneration, (h) the defendant committed murder
when under sentence of death or life imprisonment, (i) the same incident produced
multiple murder victims, (j) the defendant committed the murder while committing, or
attempting to commit, a carjacking, an attempted carjacking, armed carjacking, robbery,
arson in the first degree, or sexual offense in the first degree (MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 2-303(g)(1) (2002)).
108
5 TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03, “Capital Murder.” A person commits criminal homicide
if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence causes the death of
an individual, and (a) the victim is a peace officer or fireman killed while on duty, (b) the
murder occurred while the defendant was committing (or attempting to commit) a
kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, or arson; (c) murder “for hire”
(both the hirer and the hired); (d) the murder occurred during the course of an actual or
attempted prison break; (e) multiple murders occurred as a result of the defendant’s acts;
and (f) the victim was younger than ten years old.
109
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(22), “Special Circumstance Murder.” The defendant
intentionally killed the victim and (a) At the time of the killing, the defendant was an
active participant in a criminal street gang (but s/he does not need to have actually been
a member); (b) the defendant knew that members of the gang had engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity; and (c) the defendant killed the victim to further the activities of
the gang.
110
See Simon & Spaulding, supra note 106.
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California’s gang sentencing enhancement provision imposes a harsher
sentence on a defendant who commits a felony to benefit a street gang. 111
In the case of a murder, it makes the crime death-eligible. 112 The inclusion
of gang killings in this definition reflects the concerns about overbreadth
in the statute that are the focus of ongoing litigation in federal court.113
This overbreadth in the California statute is one of the drivers of the high
population on death row in California. 114 Accordingly, the definition of
capital-eligible homicide includes elements from each of these three
statutes.
We developed and applied classification rules in an earlier
study115 and apply them again here to distinguish capital-eligible from
non-capital-eligible homicides. The categories that define capital
eligibility include: felony murders (killings during the course of other
enumerated crimes), killings of children six years of age or younger,
multiple-victim killings, “gangland” killings, “institution” killings, sniper
killings, killings during drug transactions, and contract killings. 116
Applying this definition, figure 1 shows the distribution of capital-eligible
and other homicides from 1976-2016.

111

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22. (a) Any person who actively participates in any criminal
street gang with knowledge that the members of the gang or active participants engage in
or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who (1) commits, alone or in
concert, a felony that is one of the gang’s primary activities and is set forth in subdivision
(e), (2) aids or abets any felony committed by a member of, or an active participant in,
that gang, or (3) willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct
by members of, or an active participant in, that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment
in a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison
for 16 months, or two or three years. False (C). If the felony is a violent felony, as defined
in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, the person shall be punished by an additional term of
10 years.
112
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(22). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f).
113
Ashmus v. Wong, No. 93-CV-00594 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
114
Id. (Declaration of David C. Baldus).
115
See Fagan et al., supra note 107, at 1814-16.
116
See id.
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Source: Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 101; Fox & Fridel, supra
note 103

The rate of capital-eligibility over time was quite stable over time.
Figure 1 shows little fluctuation in the number of capital-eligible
homicides over the three-decade period. Nearly all the year-to-year
changes in homicides were due to changes in the rate of homicides
ineligible for capital punishment. These distinct spikes in homicides
reflected several factors, including the emergence of street-level drug
markets and the violence associated with them. 117 This increase in
homicides may also reflect the shift in homicide methods from non-gun
to gun homicides in the 1970s 118 that continued through drug epidemics
which, when combined with increasingly lethal weaponry, resulted in
increases in the peaks of the successive drug epidemics. 119
4. County Factors
We include several measures that provide a social context for
explaining county homicide and clearance rates. We develop these indicia
117

See also Jacqueline Cohen & George Tita, Diffusion in homicide: Exploring a general
method for detecting spatial diffusion processes, 15 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 451, 45565 (1999); Daniel Cork, Examining Space-Time Interaction in City-Level Homicide
Data: Crack Markets and the Diffusion of Guns Among Youth, 15 J. QUANT.
CRIMINOLOGY 379, 380-81 (1999).
118
See generally Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, CRIME IS NOT THE
PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1997).
119
See, e.g., Fagan et al., supra note 72.
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based on an extension of Donald Black’s theory of the behavior of the
law. 120 Professor Black characterizes law and its agents as the fabric of
social control. 121 Black suggests that the law will mobilize to investigate
crimes, particularly salient crimes including murder, but the extent of this
legal mobilization will vary according to characteristics of the case. In
later writing, he expands his theory to include features of the social
context in which the case and the investigation take place, with an
emphasis on social structural factors including racial composition,
aggregate criminal activity, and social organization. 122 We include racial
composition to account for the potential for conflict theories and the
concentrated disadvantage to influence legal mobilization of law
enforcement and the courts.123
We adapt his theory to the diverse contexts of counties across the
U.S. Accordingly, we include county racial composition, poverty rates,
and population density. Crime rates in the county included homicide and
robbery rates. For homicides, we used the rates of murder and
manslaughter from the Uniform Crime Reports for each calendar quarter.
We also link a range of social structural and demographic data about the
states and counties with U.S. Census data and data from other federal
datasets. We account for the criminal justice context of the county and
local policing capacity based on Criminal Justice Employment and
Expenditure (CJEE) data,124 supplemented with data from the Law
Enforcement Officers Killed in Action (LEOKA) database. 125 Because
120

See BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW, supra note 14, at 2; see also Borg & Parker,
supra note 14, at 437.
121
Robert J. Sampson, Crime in Cities: The Effect of Formal and Informal Social
Control, 8 CRIME & JUST. 271, 281-82 (1986); David L. Weisburd, Elizabeth R. Groff &
Sue-Ming Yang, Understanding and Controlling Hot Spots of Crime: The Importance of
Formal and Informal Social Controls, 15 PREVENTION SCI. 31, 40 (2014).
122
See Donald Black, The Epistemology of Pure Sociology, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 829
(1995); Borg and Parker, supra note 14, at 446-48.
123
Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and
Urban Inequality, in RACE, CRIME, AND JUSTICE: A READER 37 (1995); SEAN L.
GABBIDON, CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND CRIME (2015); Darnell F.
Hawkins, Beyond Anomalies: Rethinking the Conflict Perspective on Race and Criminal
Punishment, 65 SOC. FORCES 719 (1987); David Jacobs, Inequality and Police Strength:
Conflict Theory and Coercive Control in Metropolitan Areas, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 913
(1979).
124
NATIONAL ARCHIVE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA, EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT
DATA FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (various years), available at
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/eecjs.html.
125
U.S. DEPT. JUST., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
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census data is decennial, we use only data through 2009 for analyses that
control for county characteristics and criminal justice expenditures and
personnel.
Finally, to estimate whether the presence of a valid death statute
incentivizes police investigations of potentially capital-eligible
homicides, we use data from the Death Penalty Information Center to
measure whether each homicide takes place in a county, state and year
with a valid death penalty statute. 126
5. Clearance Rates
We use clearance rates to estimate the production of a supply of
capital-eligible homicides eligible for prosecution. From the SHR, any
homicide where there was offender information was considered “cleared”
and included in the supply of cases that could become death cases. 127 We
did the same for robberies. Robberies were included since (a) felony
murders were the majority of capital-eligible homicides, and (b) robberies
were the majority of predicate crimes in the broader category of felony
murders.128
B. Analysis
We used hierarchical logit models to identify the factors that
explained the differences in the supply of capital-eligible cases as
measured by clearance rates. This class of multivariate models is
particularly sensitive to the processes where the effects of variables at one
level of explanation—here, case characteristics—are moderated by the
context in which they operate—here, counties or states.129
KILLED AND ASSAULTED (various years), available at https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/.
126
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., YEAR END REPORT: THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2017
(2018), available at https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEnd2017.
127
We could not estimate the clearance rate for Black Offender-White Victim (BO/WV),
or Other Race Offender – White Victim (OO/WV) homicides. Our definition of clearance
required the identification of an offender in the SHR data. At the police stage, offender
race is usually unknown until a suspect has been identified and arrested. According, all
BO/WV and OO/WV cases were by definition cleared, and were identified only by victim
race in the analyses.
128
Fagan, Zimring & Geller, supra note 107, at 1819.
129
See generally STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL
LINEAR MODELS: APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS (2d ed.) (2002);
ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS (2006); Sophia Rabe-Hesketh, Anders Skrondal &
Andrew Pickles, Generalized Multilevel Structural Equation Modeling, 69
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The model takes the general form of:
Logit-1(Clear i,j) = β0,j*i + β1,j*VicRacei,j + β2*Casei,j + εi,j
. . .where β0,j = δ0 + δ1*Countyj + δ2*State + ηj identifies county
parameter estimates for country j in each year, and β1,j = δ0 + δ1*Countyj
+ δ2*State + ηj identifies the effects of county parameter estimates on
whether a case was cleared by victim race and the effects of the presence
of a death statute, and is a vector of state covariates, including whether
the state was death state in each period. Each regression includes a linear
function for time (calendar quarter) and time. The second term accounts
for the curvilinear shape of the curves on total homicides.
Coefficients from the logit estimations therefore represent the
odds ratio of clearance rates for each construct of interest, beginning with
race and then iteratively adding additional potential explanatory factors.
We begin with a model that measures the unadjusted difference in
clearance rates between homicides by victim race. From these models, we
can determine the odds of a homicide being “cleared” via arrest in each
year. The analyses proceed in stages, additional variables are included at
each iteration to examine the influence of various categories of case,
victim, or county characteristics on the likelihood that a capital-eligible
homicide will be cleared. We estimate several iterations of each model
with different combinations of predictors.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the breakdown of cases during the study period by
type of homicide. Of the 613,602 homicides during the study period,
25.2% were classified as capital-eligible. This parameter is consistent
with the rate reported by Fagan et al. (2006) using the same definition for
the 1974-2003 period. The point estimate is similar to the estimate
reported in studies where researchers systematically reviewed the details
of each case to determine death-eligibility. For example, based on the
construction of a definition based on statutes and a case-level file review,
Paternoster et al. found that 25.7% of cases in Maryland from 1978-1999
were capital-eligible, including 21.8% of the cases of intra-race
killings. 130 In Georgia, the Atlanta Journal Constitution used a similar

PSYCHOMETRIKA 167 (2004); Thaxton, supra note 85.
130
Raymond Paternoster & Robert Brame, Reassessing Race Disparities in Maryland
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method of case review to determine the rate of capital-eligible cases from
1994-2005.131 Their analysis showed a rate of 27.4% of all first and
second degree murders, a rate higher than that reported in Georgia for a
period a decade earlier despite using the same coding and classification
procedure.

Capital Cases, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 971, 984, 989 (2008).
131
See Rankin et al., supra note 63; Fagan & Paternoster, supra note 98.
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Table 1. Capital Eligible Homicides, All States, 1976-2016
Capital-Eligible Homicides by Category
% of All
Category*
Homicides during Crimes
Institution Killings
Gangland Killings
Youth Gang Killings
Sniper Killings
Murders of Children 6 and
younger
Killings of Police Officers
Multiple Victims
Total Capital Eligible**
Total Non-Capital Eligible
Total

N
67,972
929
3,123
20,177
519

Homicides
11.1
0.2
0.5
3.3
0.1

27,557
2,753
50,286
154,321
359,281
613,602

4.5
0.4
8.2
25.2
74.8
100.0

% of CapitalEligible
Homicides
51.4
0.7
2.2
15.5
0.4
13.8
4.1
17.9
100.0

Capital-Eligible Homicides during Crimes by Crime Type
% of All
Category
Robbery
Rape
Burglary
Arson
Total

N
54,012
3,994
5,661
4,305
67,972

Homicides
8.8
0.7
0.9
0.7
11.1

% of CapitalEligible
Homicides
44.0
2.6
3.7
2.8
51.4

Sources: Uniform Crime Reports, Supplemental Homicide Reports,
1978-2016 various years. Uniform Crime Reports, Law Enforcement
Officers Killed in Action, various years.
* Homicides are limited to those committed by offenders aged 16 or
above from 1976-2005. After 2005, minors were no longer eligible for
capital punishment (Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Homicides
by offenders of unknown ages also are excluded. Homicides committed
by offenders younger than 16 are not considered capital-eligible, and
homicides by offenders under the age of 16 were not eligible for
execution following (Thompson v, Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 1988).
** Total Capital Eligible Homicides is less than the sum of the individual
categories, due to overlaps in the categories. For example, 6,007
homicides committed during the course of other crimes had multiple
victims, and 697 homicides committed in the course of other crimes had
multiple offenders. The 2,753 killings of police officers are included in
other capital-eligible crimes. Killings of police officers exclude the
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deaths of 92 police officers resulting from the events of September 11,
2001.

Table 1 shows that over half (51.1%) of the capital-eligible
homicides in this period were felony murders, or murders that were
committed in the course of another felony offense. Of these, over four in
five (44.0% of the 51.4%) were killings committed during robberies.
Regardless of whether the offender intended to kill the victim, felony
murders remain eligible crimes for the most serious available punishment
in 49 of the 50 states and in federal criminal law. 132 Other common
categories of capital-eligible murders include gang killings (15.5%) and
murders of young children (13.8%).
Figure 2 shows the total number of homicides and the number of
homicides by victim race for each year. Accordingly, Latino homicide
victims are included with the White victim counts. Figure 2 shows a
higher number of White victims than Black or Other Race victims until
1988. Homicide victimization rates declined for all groups starting in
1993, and declined slowly from 2000-2009, the end of the time period for
the analysis period. The pattern of increase and decline for Black
homicide victims mirrored the national trend over time. The number of
White homicide victims was slightly higher prior to 1986. Beginning in
1987, the pattern of increase and decline for both Black and White victims
followed the aggregate nationwide pattern. This temporal phase is
consistent with the onset of the “crack era” in the late 1980s.133

132

See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV.
59 (2004); see generally GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER (2012).
133
See generally Bruce D. Johnson, Terry Williams, Kojo A. Dei & Harry Sanabria,
Drug Abuse in the Inner City: Impact on Hard-Drug Users and the Community, 13 CRIME
& JUST. 9 (1990); Jeffrey Grogger & Michael Willis, The Emergence of Crack Cocaine
and the Rise in Urban Crime Rates, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 519 (2000).
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Source: Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 101; Fox & Fridel,
supra note 103

Despite common trajectories in homicide victimization, clearance
rates varied by victim race over time. Figures 3a and 3b show clearance
rates by victim race, for Black and White victims for capital-eligible
homicides. While the trends in the total number of capital-eligible
homicides show slight differences for Black and White victim events, the
clearance rates are dramatically different. Figure 3a shows that White
victim homicides declined slowly over time from a 1991 peak, with the
total number in 2009 nearly half the count from 1996. Clearance rates rose
by nearly 20 percentage points during the same time, from a low of 62%
in 1980 to nearly 80% by 2010.
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Source: Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 101; Fox & Fridel,
supra note 103

We next completed two regressions to determine factors within
cases as well as in the county contexts that might explain these different
patterns. Table 2 shows results for a series of iterative models, beginning
with a baseline model with only victim race and continuing through a final
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model with all predictors, including whether the homicide took place in a
county in a state with a valid death statute. 134 The regression estimates
(coefficients) are reported as odds ratios: the odds that the police will clear
a capital-eligible homicide compared to a non-capital-eligible. An odds
ratio greater than 1.0 indicates that clearance is more likely, and an odds
ratio of less than 1.0 indicates that clearance of a homicide for that factor
is less likely.
Table 2. Random Effects Logistic Regression of CapitalEligible Homicide Clearance Rates, 1976-2009 (Odds
Ratio, SE, p)
Model
1
Case
Factors
Victim - Black

0.768 ***

[.009]
Victim - Other
Race

0.831 ***

[.022]
Female Victim
Elderly Victim
Child Victim
Gun Homicide
Felony Murder
County Factors
% Black
Population
% Other Race
Population
Total County
Population

134

2

0.762 ***

[.0009]

3

4

5

6

.867 *** 0.905 *** 0.929 ***
.927 ***
[.016]
[.017]
[.020]
[.020]

0.827 ***

.967
[.022]
[.039]
1.386 *** 1.176 ***
[.018]
[.023]
.835 *** .801 ***
[.032]
[.452]

0.959

.929 ***
[.040]
[.004]
[.043]
1.140 *** 1.098 **
1.094 ***
[.023]
[.025]
[.025]
0.799 *** 0.810 *** 0.814 **
[.046]
[.051]
[.019]
4.240 *** 3.751 *** 3.734 *** 3.597 ***
3.564 ***

[0.101]
0.974 *
[0.013]
1.098 ***
[0.013]

[.137]
[.145]
1.080 *** 1.121 ***

[.130]

1.021
[.020]
1.001
[.018

[.022]

0.93

[.145]
1.120 ***

[.018]

[.025]
***
0.916 ***
0.917
[.019]
[.019]

.951
[.144]

[.028]

0.959 *

[.025]

1.582 **

1.700 *

[.035]

.143*** 0.183 *** 0.185 ***
[.052]
[.072]
[.064]
1.000*** .999 *** .999 ***
[.001]
[.0001]
[.0001]

The panel was adjusted for death penalty eligibility based on the year of passage of a
valid post-Gregg statute and also for the abolition of capital punishment in New York
(2005) and New Jersey (2007).
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Homicides (N)
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1.000*** 1.000 *** 1.000 ***
[.0001]
[.0006]
[.001]

Police Officers
per Capita

0.984 *

[.008]
Punishment
Index

0.969 ***

[.005]
(Log) Robbery
Rate

0.959 *

[.008]
0.877 ***

[.006]

0.890 ***

0.863 ***
[.015]
.972
[.044]
2.573 *** 1.940 ** 4.524 *** .001*** .001 *** 122.690 ***
[.094]
[.077]
[.291]
[.0005]
[.0007]
[63.27]
75,846
75,846
75,846
75,846
61,063
61,063

[.015]

Death Statute
Intercept
N
County Random
Effect

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Notes. All models estimated with 50% sample of cases stratified by death and non-death states.
Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p < .001

Model 1 in Table 2 shows only the odds of clearance by victim
race. Compared to White victims, a murder of a Black victim is 23.2%
less likely to be cleared (1-.768). For murders of Other Race victims,
mostly Hispanics, the odds of clearance by arrest are 16.9% lower (1.831) than the odds for White victim cases. Model 2 adds characteristics
of the case, including victim status (elderly, child), gender, and the type
of murder. The odds by victim race are only slightly changed, and the
clearance rates for murders with Black or Other Race victims remain
significantly lower compared to White victim cases. Females and child
victim cases are significantly more likely to be cleared, and by substantial
odds: 38.6% more likely for female victims, and 324% more likely for
child victims. Elderly homicide victim cases are significantly less likely
(16.5%) compared to younger victim cases. Felony murders are about
10% more likely to be cleared by arrest, but gun homicide cases are
slightly less likely (2.6%) to be cleared.
Model 3 in Table 2 repeats Model 2 but includes a parameter
(random effect) for the county. The random effect captures unique but
unmeasured characteristics of the county where the murder took place that
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might affect the probability of being cleared by arrest.135 The odds of
clearance by arrest change for some victim or offense characteristics, once
we account for the possibility of county effects. For Black victim cases,
the odds remain significantly lower for clearance compared to White
victim cases, but the odds ratio is higher, 13.3%, nearly half the odds
compared to Model 2 with no county controls. The odds ratio of clearance
of an Other Race victim homicide cases are no longer significant. The
same is true for felony murders and gun homicides. Child victim cases
and female victim cases again are significantly more likely to be cleared
compared to adult or male victim cases, but the odds ratios are lower. The
pattern of results in Model 2 suggest that county context does influence
the likelihood of clearance of a capital-eligible crime.
Models 4-6 explore some of the specific features of counties that
may account for the reduced clearance odds. Model 4 includes the racial
composition of the county and the total population. It also includes the
number of non-capital-eligible homicides to account for the total burden
on police departments of homicide investigations. Model 4 includes
covariates for race-specific and total population, and the additional noncapital-eligible homicide investigation caseload. The odds ratio for
clearance of Black victim homicides decreases compared to the previous
models in Table 2 with the inclusion of these additional covariates, and
remains significant and below 1.0. The difference in this odds ratio in
Model 4 is about .038, of 3.8% less chance of clearance. The results for
Other Race victim capital-eligible homicides remains essentially
unchanged.
Model 4, then, suggests that there are race-specific population
dynamics that slightly increase the odds of clearance for a Black victim
homicide, but the gap in the likelihood of clearance compared to
similarly-situated White victim homicides remains nearly 10%.
Model 5 adds parameters of the criminal justice environment of
the counties, including police resources, crime rates and incarceration
rates per crime (punishment index). The odds ratio for clearance of a
135

See, e.g., Andrew Bell & Kelvyn Jones, Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects
Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data, 3 POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS
133 (2015); Enrique Gracia Fuster et al., Exploring Neighborhood Influences on SmallArea Variations in Intimate Partner Violence Risk: A Bayesian Random-Effects Modeling
Approach, 11 INT. J. ENV. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 866 (2014); Tom S. Clark & Drew A.
Linzer, Should I Used Fixed or Random Effects?, 3 POL. SCI. RES & METHODS 399
(2015).
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Black victim capital-eligible homicide remains significant but increase by
about .024 (2.4%) with the addition of covariates reflecting the criminal
justice context. In addition, the percent Black population was not
significant in Model 4 but becomes significant in Model 5, and is
relatively large. Among the variables added in Model 5, several are
significant and the odds ratios are below 1.0. These additional variables
suggest that a stronger criminal justice context decreases the odds of
clearance overall of a capital eligible homicide. Together, the context
variables have little influence on changes in the odds of clearance of a
either a Black victim or an Other Race capital-eligible homicide.
Model 6 includes the presence of a death statute in the county
where the homicide took place, a proxy for the possibility that the prospect
of a death sentence may incentivize police to more aggressively pursue
capital-eligible homicide investigations. The presence of a death statute
in the county where the homicide took place has almost no effect on the
clearance rates: the odds of clearance in a county in a state with a valid
death statute are 2.8% lower than other counties, but the effect is not
significant. The odds ratio of clearance of an Other Race victim capitaleligible homicide changes little but become significant in Model 6 with
the addition of the death statute variable to the regression.
The regressions in Table 3 examine the effects of capital-eligible
homicides by disaggregating the results from Model 6 in Table 2 into
separate estimates for death and non-death states. Model 1 in Table 3
repeats the results of Model 6 in Table 2, and provides a basis to compare
the results of the disaggregated models. For Black victim homicides, he
clearance rate is 8.2% lower compared to White victim homicides in death
states. In non-death states, the odds ratio is not significant. Neither state
model shows a significant odds ratio for clearance of Other Race capitaleligible homicides. The difference between the two estimates hints at
incentives for clearing White victim that may reflect the presence of a
death statute in the county. The effects for non-capital eligible homicides
are significant in both models, but the odds ratios barely differ from 1.0.
This is a result without practical significance. 136

136
For a discussion of the distinction between statistical and practical significant, see
generally Roger E. Kirk, Practical Significance: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 56
EDUC. & PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 746 (1996); see also Chet Miller, Andreas Schwab &
William H. Starbuck, Moving Beyond Tradition: Why and How to Replace Statistical
Significance Tests with Better Methods, ACAD. MANAGEMENT PROCEEDINGS (2017).
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Table 3. Random Effects Logistic Regression of Capital-Eligible
Homicide Clearance Rates in Counties in Death and Non-Death
States, 1976-2009 (OR, SE, p)
Counties in
All States
1

Counties in
Counties in
Death States Non-Death State
2
3

Case
Factors
Victim - Black
Victim - Other Race
Female Victim
Elderly Victim
Child Victim

0.929 ***

0.918***

[.020]

[.021]

[.047]

0.93

0.927

.979

[.004]

[.047]

[.112]

1.098 **

1.103***

.1.073

[.025]

[.028]

[.055]

0.810 ***

0.886

[.051]

[.063]

[.075]

3.597 ***

3.823***

2.913 ***

[.145]
Gun Homicide

1.121 ***
[.025]

Felony Murder

0.917 ***
[.019]

[0.176]
1.139***
[0.029]
0.878***
[0.021]

.963

.590 ***

[.244]
1.051
[.052]
1.113 ***
[.054]

County
Factors
% Black Population

1.582 **
[.028]

% Other Race Population

0.183 ***
[.072]

Total County Population

.999 ***
[.0001]

Non-Capital Eligible
Homicides

1.000 ***
[.0006]

Police Officers per Capita

0.984 *
[.008]

Punishment Index

0.969 ***
[.005]

2.053***
[0.382]
0.141***
[0.071]
1.000***
[0.0001]
1.000***
[0.0001]
0.972*
[0.012]
0.960***
[0.006]

1.022
[.673]
0.198 *
[.137]
1.000 ***
[.0001]
1.000 *
[.001]
0.993
[.011]
0.969
[.025]
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(Log) Robbery Rate

0.890 ***
[.015]

Intercept

.001 ***
[.0007]

N

61,063

0.870***
[0.017]

Vol. 23:2
0.89 ***
[.022]

1.940***

2.556 ***

[.077]

[.983]

49,805

11,504

Notes. Models estimated with 50% sample, stratified by statute. All models
estimated with year fixed effects and random intercept by County.
Significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p < .001

The comparison of odds ratios for the county context variables
suggest other social processes at work in producing cleared capitaleligible homicides. First, and most importantly, the odds of clearance in
counties in death penalty states is significantly higher as the proportion of
Black residents in the county increases. In non-death states, the result is
not significant. The contrast between the case-level effect (lower
clearance rates for Black victim homicides) and higher clearance rates in
predominantly Black counties suggests stronger efforts to clear capitaleligible murders that are not proportional to the county’s racial
demography. The same is true in counties with higher incarceration rates
(punishment index). Perhaps this reflects that racial threat or conflict137
are motivating variables in death states to clear the most serious
homicides, and to have a more punitive criminal justice system, but the
justice benefits of policing do not extend to Black victims’ families.
Second, clearance rates of capital-eligible homicides are slightly
lower (2.8%) in counties where there is a stronger police presence. But
this effect is present only in death states; there is no effect in non-death
states. The same is true for incarceration rates: the clearance rates of
capital-eligible homicides also are slightly lower (4.0%) in counties where
the punishment index (incarceration rate) is higher. Among crime
conditions, there functionally no difference in death and non-death states
in the influence of non-capital-eligible homicides, nor for robbery rates.
Third, there are differences in death and non-death states for
certain case characteristics. Clearance rates are significantly higher for
female victims in death states; the odds ratio is not significant in non137
See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer, Race and Policing in Different Ecological Contexts, in
RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLICING : NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS (M. White & S. Rice
eds., 2010); see also Borg & Parker, supra note 14; BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW,
supra note 14.
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death states. The clearance rates are higher for child victims in both death
and non-death states, but the odds ratio is nearly 25% higher in death
states. Gun homicide clearance rates are significant and higher in death
states, but there is no effect in non-death state. Felony murders have the
opposite effects in death and non-death states: felony murders are less
likely (12.2%) in death states, but more likely to be cleared in non-death
states (11.3% higher).
To illustrate the sensitivity of clearance rates to variation in
county contextual effects, we estimated the marginal effects of clearance
rates by county racial composition. Figure 4 shows LOESS estimates of
the effects of the county Black population on clearance rates for capitaleligible homicides.138 Donald Black suggested that the percent of minority
population would affect the behavior of legal institutions with respect to
minority and disadvantaged populations. 139 The political and social
priorities of legal agencies would vary with the status of the affected
population. Figure 4 confirms Black’s prediction. Clearance rates for
capital-eligible homicides decline as the Black share of the county
population increases beyond 20%. About 75% of capital eligible
homicides are cleared when the Black population is below 20%. At the
other end of the distribution, the clearance rate drops below 60% when
the Black population is about 75% of the county population. These
estimates are controlled for the total homicide rate, the total population
and the overall homicide rate.

138

LOESS (LOcally WEighted Scatter-plot Smoother) estimates a boosted regression
model that shows the relationship of two variables across levels of the predictor variable,
with the option to include other variables in the LOESS estimates. This is a nonparametric
method because the linearity assumptions of conventional regression methods have been
relaxed. Instead of estimating parameters in a standard regression model, a LOESS
nonparametric regression focuses on the fitted curve. The fitted points and their standard
errors represent are estimated with respect to the whole curve rather than a particular
estimate of one predictor. See generally Matthias Schonlau, Boosted Regression
(Boosting): An Introductory Tutorial and a Stata Plugin, 5 STATA J. 330 (2005).
139
BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW, supra note 14.
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Figure 5 shows the importance of police presence in improving
the clearance rate for capital eligible homicides. 140 These also are LOESS
estimates that control for police strength per capita, the number of capitaleligible homicides, and the total population. At low per capita police
strength (15 or fewer officers per 1,000 persons), clearance rates hover
around 60%. When police strength increases above 15 officers per 1,000
persons, the clearance rate for capital eligible homicides increases to
nearly 80%. Counties with more police officers have obvious advantages
in investigations of homicides overall. But even with these advantages,
Figure 4 shows that disparities remain in clearance rates that privilege
White victim homicides in the search for justice.
Figure 6 shows that clearance rates are higher when the robbery
rate is lower, but clearance rates for capital-eligible homicides decline as
the robbery rate increases. Robbery is a salient crime, and often the
140

To illustrate the meaning of police strength in terms of county or city size, the city of
Cincinnati has a population of approximately 298,800 in 2016. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
QUICKFACTS,
available
at
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/cincinnaticityohio/PST045216. There are
approximately 1,000 sworn officers in the Cincinnati Police Department. See also
CINCINNATI POLICE, https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
This translates into a rate of 3.35 officers per 1,000 population.
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politics of local criminal justice are influenced by robbery, one of the
salient fear-inducing crimes.141 Robbery rates also are significantly higher
in cities with higher concentrations of Black populations.142 Accordingly,
the lower clearance rates for Black victim capital-eligible homicides
overall means that these cases may compete with robberies for scarce
investigations resources in smaller police agencies. 143 In these models, the
Black victim homicide odds ratio estimates the clearance odds of Black
victim cases relative to White victim cases. If there is a competition for
investigative resources, the results in Table 3 suggest that they are
allocated differently in death and non-death states, and that there is more
attention to the politically salient robbery cases at the expense of Black
victim capital-eligible homicides.
Figure 7 shows that the incarceration rate has a small negative
effect on capital-eligible clearance rates. There are no simple explanations
for the connection between incarceration rates and homicide clearance
rates, other than local priorities. Higher rates of incarceration consume
police resources, diverting police in these places from homicide
investigations, which may be difficult to clear for Black victims, to
investigation of other felonies that translate into prison sentences in court.
If this is a resource allocation question, then the priorities set by police
executives seem to slightly devalue the agency’s performance in
investigation of capital-eligible cases when the victim is Black. Perhaps
it’s easier to obtain convictions for drug crimes or other priority crimes in
a police agency, compared to Black victim capital-eligible homicides. If
that is the case, police executives are simply maximizing their returns for
higher rate crimes (robberies, drug crimes) and devaluing the pursuit of
the more difficult homicide cases. That this choice is conflated with race
suggests either neglect or indifference to Black homicide victims.
These results suggest that the race-of-victim disparities in capital
sentencing observed by Baldus et al. in McCleskey and others throughout
141

See, e.g., DAN A. LEWIS & GRETA W. SALEM, FEAR OF CRIME: INCIVILITY AND THE
PRODUCTION OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM (2017); GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY: STREET
CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA (1999); RALPH B. TAYLOR,
BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS : BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE
NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GRIME, FEAR, AND DECLINE (2000).
142
Sampson, supra note 122.
143
See, e.g., LEOVY, supra note 59, at 20-26 (describing the tensions between the LAPD
homicide divisions in poorer, predominantly Black and Latino areas of South Los
Angeles and the robbery-homicide divisions that investigate these crimes in wealthy areas
of that city).
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the post-Furman era can be traced to procedural disparities that long
precede charging and sentencing decisions, and are observed as early as
the clearance of capital-eligible homicides. Much of this observed
disparity can be explained by the varying social contexts in which Whitevictim and minority-victim homicides occur, and also by the geography
of capital punishment law. Most notably, in large counties, and counties
with large concentrations of minority residents, capital-eligible homicides
are significantly more likely to be cleared, but Black victim capital
eligible homicides are less likely to be cleared. Especially for White
victim homicides, the lower clearance rates in death states for non-White
victim homicides suggests a premium on White lives for justice and
retribution for capital crimes that may not be present in the absence of an
option to impose the most severe punishment available. This may tell us
as much about the legal institutions and their preferences and tastes for
punishment as it does about the features of the homicides that begin the
supply process that can lead to execution.
DISCUSSION
The race-of-victim disparities in capital sentencing observed by
Baldus et al. (1987), the General Accounting Office (1990), and others
summarized by Professor Grosso et al.144 can be traced to procedural
disparities that precede prosecutorial charging decisions and jurors’
sentencing decisions. These disparities can be observed as early as the
police investigations and clearance of capital-eligible homicides. A
substantial portion of this observed disparity can be explained by the
varying social contexts in which White-victim and minority-victim
homicides occur. The importance of context can be seen initially and
perhaps most starkly in the third column of Table 2, in which the addition
of county-level intercepts substantially reduces the marginal difference
between White-victim and minority-victim clearance rates, and these gaps
are further narrowed as additional county-level characteristics are
controlled for. But it’s also important to remember that there is robust
evidence of a Black victim homicide clearance disparity, net of a host of
case and context factors, that seems to initiate a process that carries
forward to prosecutorial decisions.
Still, much remains to be learned about the contextual factors that
influence homicide clearance, or explain the differences between White

144

Grosso et al., supra note 23.
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and Black victim capital-eligible homicide clearance rates. Clearance
rates are significantly lower in counties that contain greater proportions
of Black residents; however, we know little about the socioeconomic or
criminal justice factors in those places that explain these differences.
Moreover, controlling both crime conditions and criminal justice contexts
explains virtually none of the relationship between county Black
population and case clearance. And there is little in these data to explain
the extremely low clearance odds in counties with higher proportions of
“Other Race” populations. 145
Our findings suggest that the equal protection concerns raised by
Baldus et al. (1987) about capital punishment continue to resonate in the
modern legal system. To the extent that race-of-victim disparities can be
traced to procedural differences, or resource limitations in places where
minority-victim homicides take place, they may potentially be mitigated
by equalizing the distribution of police resources across regions.
However, racial disparities that exceed those predicted by the unequal
distribution of resources raise serious doubts as to whether the death
penalty can be equitably applied.
If racism is relevant in the charging and prosecution of capitaleligible defendants, 146 is there a different form of racism that explains the
inability of police to achieve parity in police investigations of capitaleligible homicides? Why the difficulty in clearing Black victim capitaleligible homicides, if not all homicides? Certainly, some of the clearance
gap can be traced to differences in the variety of homicides, and in the
differences in communities of different racial and ethnic makeups to
cooperate with police.
For example, we find that felony murders are less likely to be
cleared via arrest. These account for nearly half of all capital-eligible
homicides, and are more likely to involve stranger crimes including
robbery and burglary. Recent research has shown that residents of
neighborhoods with high rates of violent crime tend to be places where
there is less willingness of communities of different racial and ethnic
145

Here, it may be important to remember that due to coding decisions in the
construction of the SHR imputed files, Hispanics are included in the “Other Race”
population, together with East and South Asians, Native Americans, and Pacific
Islanders.
146
Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing
Act be Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?,
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 777 (1990).
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makeups to cooperate with police. 147 In these same places, racial
preferences among police administrators may also dilute both the skills
and experiences of police assigned to investigate homicides in those
areas.148 In general, there likely is a cooperation gap that may stifle police
investigations of homicides, whether capital-eligible or not, in non-White
communities that suffer from higher rates of both crime and aggressive
policing.149
But then, why the cooperation gap? Even as crime rates declined
for two decades, tensions between citizens and police rose, especially
among African Americans150 and, to a lesser extent, among Latinos. 151 In
the 1990s, at the outset of the homicide and general crime decline, much
of the distrust was focused on racial profiling by police. 152 Over time, the
distrust of police by minority citizens expanded to include police use of
force, 153 and later, everyday policing of disorder. 154
When there is a White homicide victim, police may sense more
urgency and scrutiny of their efforts, leading to higher clearance rates
compared to Black or Latino victim killings. 155 In her NPR series, Martin
147

See, e.g., Kirk & Matsuda, supra note 15; LEOVY, supra note 59; Desmond et. al.,
supra note 89.
148
See generally LEOVY, supra note 59.
149
Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy:
Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 751, 775 (2014); Mark T. Berg et al., supra note 81; Bell, supra note 81.
150
See RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA :
CONFLICT AND REFORM (2006); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:
Why “Driving While Black Matters”, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 288-90 (1999); Lawrence D.
Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black and White Americans’ Views on
the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 156-57 (2004).
151
See MARK HUGO LOPEZ & GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, Hispanics
and the Criminal Justice System: Low Confidence, High Exposure (2009).
152
See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999); R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race,
Policing and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003); Harris, supra note 151.
153
Steven A. Tuch & Ronald Weitzer, Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward Police,
61 PUB. OPINION Q. 642, 643-647 (1997) (showing a stronger negative response by
African Americans compared to Whites in responses to highly publicized incidents of
police use of force).
154
See, e.g., Tyler et al., supra note 96 at 262-64; David S. Kirk & Andrew V.
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quotes crime reporter Rocco Parascondola’s reports that clearance rates
of murders in New York City in 2013 were nearly twice as high for White
victims (86%) compared to Black victim homicides (45%) or Latino
victim homicides (56%).156 He cited a growing “no snitch” culture that
militates against cooperation with police, a sign of the weak police
legitimacy in non-White neighborhoods. Witness intimidation may also
be a factor in low cooperation. 157
Distrust today is a two-way street. Fagan and Richman briefly
touched on signs of a police pullback or withdrawal in the face of citizen
and political criticism, extensive video surveillance and publicity of
contested police actions, and recent killings of police. 158 Recent claims of
a police pullback in the face of criticism from communities affected by
aggressive policing and visible acts of police violence deepen the distrust.
Police in these circumstances reflects loosely coupled systems of distrust
and resentment between citizens and police that entwines violence,
cynicism and public safety into a complex and tangled ecology. Our sense
is that the language of a “chill wind” adopted by FBI Director Comey 159
is meant to capture the connections in these mechanisms, and their
consequences for policing homicide, particularly in urban areas.
The sources of the cooperation gap may also be traceable to the
common use of aggressive and proactive policing models in practice for
over two decades in many American cities.160 Even as crime rates
declined for two decades, tensions between citizens and police rose,
especially among African Americans 161 and also among Latinos.162 In the
1990s, at the outset of the homicide and general crime decline, much of
the distrust was focused on racial profiling by police. 163 Over time, the
distrust of police by minority citizens expanded to include police use of
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force, 164 and later, everyday policing of disorder. 165 In some instances,
these norms of withdrawal, distrust and resistance become norms that are
shared across generations and neighborhoods. 166
In several cities, people living in neighborhoods where homicide
is a recurring reality share a narrative about policing, community, and
murder that is strikingly similar. The stories they tell portray a social
context where murders are not uncommon but remain unsolved, where
citizens experience policing as detached from serious crime and aimed at
the wrong behaviors and the wrong people, where policing is seen as
indifferent or disrespectful if not abusive, where citizens are unwilling to
cooperate in murder investigations by the police whom they view as an
“occupation force,” and where these interlocking forces create a
reinforcing dynamic that deepens the social and economic isolation of
places that already have the features of a “poverty trap.” Beyond the
inability to provide security, citizens’ direct and vicarious experiences are
often internalized as perceived injustices. Under these circumstances,
withdrawal from cooperation with police in homicide investigations isn’t
surprising.
In a web of recurring social interactions, these perceptions—a
variety of police insults and recurring episodes of murder and other
violence—engender frustration and anger and in turn, withdrawal from
cooperation with the police. 167 Perceived injustices can disincentivize
citizens from cooperating with the police, including both “petty
indignities” and egregious acts of police violence. 168
164
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CONCLUSION
In a 2015 speech, as homicide rates were spiking in several cities
and protests against police killings of Black citizens roiled several
states,169 former FBI Director Comey spoke of “two lines: one line is law
enforcement and the other line is the folks we serve and protect, especially
in communities of color.” And he worried that “those two lines are arcing
away from each other, at an increasing rate.” 170 This extends to trust for
homicide investigations, including capital-eligible homicides.171
Clearance rates matter in reassuring people that police are dedicated to
their safety, and that they can deliver on promises of security. As these
three case studies show, the trust and cooperation of citizens is essential
to reducing murder by leveraging their cooperation in homicide
investigations. Plunket and Lundman, for example, suggested nearly 15
years ago as homicide rates were plunging in most cities, that “the
significantly lower clearance rates in Black census tracts and integrated
census tracts are a function of less trust and less cooperation and
information from citizens.” They noted, “[w]hen people are reluctant to
talk to homicide detectives, when they are uneasy about telling homicide
detectives what they saw, what they know, and what they suspect, the
necessary result is lower clearance rates.”172 We find much the same
today.
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